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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 2002, Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”)1 petitioned for
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, asking in part that the Court
decide whether a cause of action exists for monopoly leveraging.2  On March 10,
2003, the United States Supreme Court granted Verizon’s petition.3  Courts have
confronted monopoly leveraging many times throughout the course of the doctrine’s
1Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), 
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 71 U.S.L.W. 3576 (2002).  Verizon assumed this lawsuit after Bell Atlantic 
merged with GTE Corporation to form Verizon Communications.
2The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether a cause of action
for monopoly leveraging exists.
3Verizon Communications, 123 S.Ct. at 1480. The petition was limited to the following
question: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the District Court’s dismissal of
respondent’s antitrust claims? Id.
235
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history.4  In doing so, courts have either embraced the theory or flat-out rejected it.  
Even in the courts that have embraced the doctrine, however, only a few plaintiffs 
have succeeded on the merits.5
Monopoly leveraging is the use of monopoly power in one market as leverage to 
obtain a competitive advantage in another market.6  The doctrine was created based 
upon courts’ interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which deals with a 
single firm’s anticompetitive manipulation of a market. 7   Courts have provided 
various approaches in defining what constitutes a cause of action for monopoly 
leveraging. 8   Monopoly leveraging, however, cannot be established in any way 
without a firm having some pre-existing monopoly power in one market.9  The pre-
existing monopoly power must then be used in some way by the firm to exact an 
anticompetitive outcome in a second market.10  Finally, the outcome in the second 
market must result in a competitive advantage for the firm.11   
The type of outcome in the second market is where much of the disagreement 
lies.12  Circuits that have rejected the doctrine have generally done so because they 
believe that a mere competitive advantage falls short of the anticompetitive behavior 
the Sherman Act is designed to prohibit.13  As a result of the discrepancy concerning 
what kind of anticompetitive behavior the Sherman Act is designed to prohibit, the 
Supreme Court needs to set the bar once and for all, so the lower federal courts know 
whether the monopoly leveraging doctrine makes the cut. 
There are three purposes to this article.  One purpose is to demonstrate the circuit 
split on the issue of whether a cause of action for monopoly leveraging exists, and 
the need for the Supreme Court to decide the issue.  To demonstrate the split, this 
article will begin with an overview of the Sherman Act.  This article will then 
discuss the seminal cases.  It will, first, discuss the cases in various circuits that have 
embraced the doctrine and elaborated on it.  Second, this article will analyze the 
cases in circuits that rejected the doctrine and focus on their reasons for rejecting the 
                                                                
4Federal Circuit and District Court of Appeals have encountered the monopoly leveraging 
doctrine 122 times. 
5Excluding federal district courts, plaintiff has succeeded in bringing the doctrine in the 
federal court of appeals cases of Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 
1979), Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 
1988), and  Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated 
by, 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992), dismissed as moot, 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993). 
6Berkey, 603 F.2d at 275. 
7Anthony E. DiResta, “Monopoly Leveraging”: A New Section 2 Challenge for Integrated 
Firms, C847 A.L.I-A.B.A. 393, 395 (1993). 
8Id.
9Id.
10Id.
11Id.
12Gen. Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis, S.A., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1352-53 (S.D. Fla. 
2002).
13Id. at 1353. 
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doctrine.  It will also discuss the doctrine in light of two recent cases:  Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,14 which has embraced the monopoly 
leveraging doctrine, and General Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis, S.A., which has 
rejected the monopoly leveraging doctrine. 15   To demonstrate the need for the 
Supreme Court to decide the issue, this article will discuss several Supreme Court 
cases that have not only indirectly affected the doctrine, but have also sent mixed 
messages concerning its viability.16
The second purpose of this article is to determine the state of the doctrine prior to 
the Supreme Court ruling in the Verizon case, and what is required to successfully 
bring the cause of action today in the circuits that embrace the doctrine.  The final 
purpose is to determine how the Supreme Court should rule on the issue of whether a 
cause of action exists for monopoly leveraging. 
II. THE MONOPOLY LEVERAGING CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.  Overview of the Sherman Act 
The monopoly leveraging doctrine is based upon Section 2 of the Sherman Act.17
There are two general aims of the Sherman Act.18  The first aim is generally to 
prohibit anticompetitive conduct.19  The second aim is to prohibit market conditions 
that are anticompetitive.20
Section 1 of the Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”21  Because Section 1 focuses 
on specific conduct of firms and is expressly limited to conduct that involves at least 
two firms,22 its conditions are not implicated in the monopoly leveraging doctrine as 
the doctrine deals with conduct of individual firms.23  This article will show how 
courts have used Section 1, however, to fight against the validity of the monopoly 
leveraging doctrine.24
                                                                
14305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed sub nom.  Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 71 U.S.L.W. 3352 (2002). 
15Gen. Cigar Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.   
16Though the Supreme Court has not decided whether the monopoly leveraging doctrine is 
a viable cause of action under section 2 of the Sherman Act, other Supreme Court cases have 
indirectly affected the doctrine and pose great significance in determining its survival.  See
discussion infra Part III. 
17DiResta, supra note 7, at 397. 
18Id. at 395. 
19Id.
20Id.
2115 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
22DiResta, supra note 7, at 395-96. 
23Id.
24See Fineman v. Armstrong World Indust., Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993).   
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Section 2 focuses on a firm’s manipulation of a market25 by making it unlawful to 
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations.”26  Each of the activities proscribed in Section 
2 has its own elements.27  There are two elements to unlawful monopolization.28
They are: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the 
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”29  There are three elements of attempted monopolization.30  They are: “(1) 
that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anti-competitive conduct with (2) a 
specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 
power.”31
Congress realized when passing the Sherman Act that it could not possibly 
conceive of every type of activity that could effectively constitute monopolization; 
and therefore, left Section 2 broad enough to allow it to act as the vehicle for federal 
courts to use when adopting common law that targets activity that leads to 
monopolization.32  Senator John Sherman of Ohio, who was the chief proponent of 
the Sherman Act in the late 19th century, explained, “it is difficult to define in legal 
language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations.  This must be 
left for the courts to determine in each particular case.”33  As a result, there is an 
expansive common law dealing with activity that leads to monopolization.34  Three 
universally-accepted violations, actual monopolization, attempted monopolization, 
and conspiracy to monopolize, are stated expressly in Section 2. 35   They have, 
however, been expanded by the courts with regard to their elemental applications.36
Monopoly leveraging, on the other hand, is not expressly identified as violative of 
Section 2.37  Nevertheless, the courts have found that monopoly leveraging is, under 
certain circumstances, a violation thereof.38
                                                                
25DiResta, supra note 7, at 396. 
2615 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
27United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
28Id.
29Id.
30Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
31Id.
32DiResta, supra note 7 at 397. 
33 James P. Puhala, III, Antitrust Law—Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines: Different 
Approaches to Monopoly Leveraging Claims, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 111 (1994) (quoting 
Seantor Sherman).  
34Id.
35DiResta, supra note 7, at 397. 
36Id.
37Id.
38Id.
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B.  The Conception of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine 
The concept of using lawfully-gained monopoly power in one market as a lever 
to obtain a competitive advantage in another market was alluded to by the United 
States Supreme Court over fifty years ago. 39   Despite its tenuous beginnings, 
however, it later emerged into a full-fledged legal doctrine.  
The Supreme Court case that suggested the monopoly leveraging doctrine was 
United States v. Griffith.40  Here, the Court was faced with movie exhibitors who 
originally had theaters in approximately thirty-seven towns; forty-nine percent of 
which were competitive with other theaters in their respective towns and fifty-one 
percent of which were noncompetitive.41  In the towns that were noncompetitive, the 
movie exhibitors operated lawfully-gained monopolies under the scope of the 
Sherman Act.42  Five years later, however, the same movie exhibitors had theaters in 
approximately eighty-five towns; thirty-eight percent of which were competitive and 
sixty-two percent of which were noncompetitive. 43   The strategy of the movie 
exhibitors was to use their already-achieved monopoly power to bargain for 
exclusive movie distribution rights in towns in which they sought to establish 
themselves.44  As a consequence, the exhibitors were able to dramatically increase 
the number of markets in which they enjoyed monopoly power.45  The Court held 
that their use of monopoly power “to beget monopoly”46 was illegal.47  In addition to 
finding that this activity violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court 
stated in dictum that “the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to 
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is 
unlawful.”48  It additionally proclaimed that “monopoly power, whether lawfully or 
unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under 
[Section] 2 [of the Sherman Act].”49  From these broad statements, the theory of 
monopoly leveraging was born.50
                                                                
39See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
40Id.
41Id. at 102-03. 
42Id.
43Id.
44Griffith, 334 U.S. at 102. 
45Id. at 103. 
46Id. at 108. 
47Id.
48Id. at 107. 
49Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107. 
50Gen. Cigar Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at  1352.  Though not yet an expressly recognized 
legal doctrine, monopoly leveraging at this early stage in the game meant there must be some 
pre-existing monopoly power.  Pre-existing monopoly power must be used in some way to 
disrupt competition and gain a competitive advantage, and notably, intent is not required. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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Before it became an expressly-recognized legal doctrine, monopoly leveraging 
was mentioned in the broad context afforded by Griffith and in relation to other 
antitrust theories.51  In Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp.,52 for example, 
the Seventh Circuit discussed the doctrine in the realm of a tying arrangement under 
which a manufacturer who enjoyed a monopoly selling electromagnetic 
microbalances terminated a dealership when the buyer refused to also purchase the 
manufacturer’s millibalances.53  The Seventh Circuit noted that “[t]he possessor of 
[a] lawfully acquired monopoly power may not use that power as leverage to deprive 
competitors of access to customers, to force customers to maintain resale prices or in 
any other coercive manner,” 54  despite the fact that the manufacturer had not 
established a monopoly in the second millibalances market.55  The manufacturer 
additionally did not have a reasonable possibility of achieving a monopoly in the 
second market.56  Nonetheless, the leveraging of monopoly power through a tying 
arrangement, when used to gain a competitive advantage in the second market, 
constituted unlawful activity under the Sherman Act.57
The monopoly leveraging doctrine was expressly recognized in the Second 
Circuit case of Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.58  The markets involved in 
this case were cameras, film, photofinishing equipment and services, and color paper 
on which to develop the film.59  Kodak was a competitor in all of these markets, but 
it had monopoly power in the camera and film markets, controlling sixty percent and 
over eighty percent, respectively.60  Berkey competed with Kodak in several markets 
including those of photofinishing equipment and services, and the sale of cameras.61
At the same time, Berkey was a distributor of Kodak products.62  It purchased Kodak 
film in addition to other Kodak supplies for the purpose of reselling them to its own 
customers.63  In the course of their business relationship, however, Kodak developed 
a new and better type of color film, and, rather than introduce it in an existing 
format, decided to introduce it in a new 110mm format.64  Kodak then developed a 
                                                                
51See Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977). 
52Id.
53Id. at 704. 
54Id. at 712.
55Id.
56Sargent-Welch Scientific, 567 F.2d at 706. 
57Id. at 712. 
58603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). 
59Id. at 269. 
60Id. at 269-70. 
61Id.
62Id.
63Berkey, 603 F.2d at 269-70. 
64Id.
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110 Pocket Instamatic camera with which to use the new color film.65  Because the 
110mm film would only operate in the Pocket Instamatic camera, Kodak enjoyed a 
monopoly in the new film market until competitors, such as Berkey, could develop 
their own 110mm camera.66  In addition to other allegations such as tying, Berkey 
alleged that Kodak’s monopoly in the 110mm film market gave it an unfair 
advantage in the photofinishing equipment and services markets.67  The court noted 
that Kodak did not come close to gaining control of the markets and did not attempt 
to monopolize them.68
After examining previous decisions such as Griffith, which had not expressly 
recognized the doctrine, the Second Circuit affirmatively held for the first time that 
“a firm violates section 2 by using its monopoly power in one market to gain a 
competitive advantage in another, albeit without an attempt to monopolize the 
second market.”69  It further stated that “the competition in the leveraged market may 
not be destroyed but merely distorted.”70  The court, however, did not hold that any 
competitive advantage would satisfy the doctrine.71  Rather, it provided an example 
of behavior that would not satisfy the doctrine.72  “[A] large firm does not violate 
section 2 simply by reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its efficient size, 
nor does an integrated business offend the Sherman Act whenever one of its 
departments benefits from association with a division possessing a monopoly in its 
own market.” 73   The court effectively made an exclusion for large firms with 
efficient operations.  “[C]omplementary products, reduced transaction costs, and so 
forth . . . are gains that accrue to any integrated firm, regardless of its market share, 
and they cannot by themselves be considered uses of monopoly power.” 74   In 
providing this exclusion, it made the task of determining what kinds of monopoly 
power are prohibited difficult because that which constitutes the large firm with 
efficient operations is largely vague.75
Certainly the doctrine made headway as an expressly-recognized legal doctrine 
after Berkey Photo, but because of the newly-created difficulty in determining what 
kinds of monopoly power are prohibited under the efficient operations exception, the 
doctrine remained in a state of confusion.76
                                                                
65Id.
66Id. at 268. 
67Id. at 267-68. 
68Berkey, 603 F.2d at 275. 
69Id.
70Id.
71Id.
72Id.
73Berkey, 603 F.2d at 276. 
74Id.
75Puhala, supra note 33, at 123. 
76Id.
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C.  Progression of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine 
Courts in several circuits accepted the doctrine despite the state in which Berkey 
Photo left it.  Courts even elaborated upon the principles set forth in Berkey Photo in 
order to clear up some of the confusion.  The Sixth Circuit adopted the principles set 
forth in Berkey Photo and Griffith in Kerasotes Michigan Theatres, Inc. v. National 
Amusements, Inc.77  The facts are similar to Griffith.  National Amusements alleged 
that Kerasotes used its monopoly power as a movie exhibitor outside the region of 
Flint, Michigan, as leverage to obtain exclusive exhibition rights of first run films 
inside the region of Flint.78  Though National Amusement’s claim was dismissed in 
the district court pursuant to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. § 12(b)(6), the circuit court stated that National Amusement’s 
leveraging claim was a viable antitrust cause of action sufficient to defeat such a 
motion.79
A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town commands the 
entrance for all films into that area.  If he uses that strategic position to 
acquire exclusive privileges in a city where he has competitors, he is 
employing his monopoly power as a trade weapon against his 
competitors.80
The court thereby reinforced the idea that monopoly leveraging is the use of 
monopoly power as a lever to gain a competitive advantage in another competitive 
market, while confirming that it is not necessary to possess monopoly power or a 
dominate market position in the second market.81  It additionally tried to clarify the 
Kodak exception by stating that monopoly leveraging occurs when a firm attempts 
“to extend a business dominance from one market into a second market, without 
having to achieve that dominance in the second market by developing a superior 
product or as the result of other legitimate competitive advantages.”82
The monopoly leveraging doctrine was reaffirmed by the Second Circuit in 
Grandlight & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.83  Grandlight alleged that defendant, 
Micro Switch, had used its market power in its basic, core-line products to gain a 
                                                                
77854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom. G.K.C. Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Amusements, Inc. 490 U.S. 1087 (1989). 
78Id. at 136. 
79Id. at 136. (“We believe National has adequately alleged a viable antitrust cause of 
action sufficient at least to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.  Kerasotes' alleged behavior, 
using its dominant market position in non-Flint areas to obtain first run films in Flint, which 
they would not have been able to obtain in a competitive process, does indeed constitute 
‘leveraging,’ which is forbidden by the antitrust laws”).  Id.
80Id. at 137. 
81Id. (“We expressly reject the district court's reasoning that leverage or the abuse of 
monopoly power is not actionable when the offender has not yet acquired a dominant position 
in the affected market”).  Id. 
82Id.
83771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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competitive advantage in its ventured line.84  The court, in reaffirming that a cause of 
action for monopoly leveraging exists, broke down the claim of monopoly 
leveraging into three factors.85  First, there must be some form of monopoly power in 
one existing market.86  Second, as seen in Berkey, there must be use of monopoly 
power in one market to foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage, or 
destroy a competitor.87  Third, there must be an injury caused by the conduct.88
Applying these elements, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that the 
plaintiff did not meet its burden of establishing that the defendant used its monopoly 
power to gain a competitive advantage.89
The Eleventh Circuit recognized a claim for monopoly leveraging in Key 
Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospital.90  The facts of the case surrounded 
the rental and sale of durable medical equipment in Venice, Florida.91   Venice 
Hospital enjoyed a monopoly in acute care as it had eighty percent of the patient 
hospital admissions in Venice, and few Venice area residents would go to 
neighboring hospitals outside of Venice.92  A supplier of durable medical equipment 
brought a cause of action against the hospital when the hospital implemented a joint 
venture with a private corporation, that was also a supplier of durable medical 
equipment.93  The joint venture excluded the plaintiff supplier and other competing 
vendors from selling their durable medical products to the hospital’s patients.94
The jury concluded, and the circuit court agreed, that Venice Hospital had 
intentions of abusing the monopoly power it enjoyed in the acute care market to 
exclude competitors from the durable medical equipment market in Venice, 
Florida.95  When finding in the affirmative for the monopoly leveraging claim, the 
court looked to three factors.96  One, Venice Hospital had a pre-existing monopoly 
power in the acute care market.97  Two, the hospital “willfully used that power to 
foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage or destroy a competitor in a 
                                                                
84Id.
85Id.
86Id.
87Id.
88Grandlight, 771 F.2d at 681. 
89Id.
90919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992), dismissed as 
moot 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993). 
91Id. at 1552. 
92Id. at 1553. 
93Id. at 1553-54. 
94Id. at 1553-54. 
95Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d  at 1567. 
96Id.
97Id.
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different market.”98 Three, as a result of the hospital’s actions the plaintiff supplier of 
durable medical equipment was injured in that it was excluded from access to 
customers.99
The court focused heavily on the intent requirement, more so than previous cases 
that adopted the monopoly leveraging doctrine, and noted that “[t]he key to 
distinguishing unlawful monopoly leveraging from lawful competitive advantage 
available as a result of integration is intent.”100  It went so far as to provide two ways 
in which the plaintiff could properly prove the element of intent.101  The first was 
through a showing that the hospital had a conscious objective to leverage its 
monopoly power in the acute care market to obtain an unlawful advantage or to 
injure other suppliers in the durable medical equipment market.102  This approach, 
commonly used to prove intent for other causes of action such as fraud, requires a 
high degree of proof as it is difficult to discern one’s conscious objective.  The court, 
however, provided an alternative approach which required a lesser degree of proof.103
It stated that intent can be established simply by showing that “the unlawful 
competitive advantage or injury to competitors in the durable medical equipment 
market was the necessary and direct consequence of defendant Venice Hospital’s 
conduct or business arrangements.” 104   This approach seems to allow for the 
fulfillment of the intent requirement by substituting a showing of a causal connection 
between the unlawful leveraging and the plaintiff’s injury.105   
In addition to providing a framework for establishing the intent requirement in a 
monopoly leveraging analysis, the court reinforced the long-recognized notion that a 
firm that enjoys a lawful monopoly is permitted to receive the natural benefits to 
which it is entitled.106  The court, however, may have done so at the expense of the 
doctrine.  After mentioning that a firm may receive those natural benefits, it stated, 
“[h]owever, when a party with monopoly power abuses its monopoly power in one 
market as a means of gaining an unlawful competitive advantage in and 
monopolizing another market, we have no hesitation to conclude that the Sherman 
Act prohibits such conduct.”107  That statement may have constituted a blow to the 
doctrine if the court really meant the four words “and monopolizing another 
market.”108
                                                                
98Id.
99Id.
100Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d at 1567-68. 
101Id. at 1567. 
102Id.
103Id.
104Id.
105Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d at 1567. 
106Id.
107Id. at 1568. 
108Id.
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The core idea behind monopoly leveraging is that the firm does not have to 
monopolize the second market to offend Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  If 
monopolization in the second market is required, the leveraging doctrine is narrowed 
to the point of being toothless.  This is because monopolization in the second market 
would require the high degree of anticompetitive behavior that is actionable under 
the offense of monopolization.  At that level of anticompetitive behavior, the 
monopoly leveraging doctrine is not necessary.  It would only serve the purpose of 
more clearly defining how the firm achieved its monopoly in the second market.   
In the Ninth Circuit, the court suggested its concurrence with the doctrine.109  In 
M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,110 the plaintiff brought an action under Section 2, 
asserting that Texaco had monopoly power in the sale of gasoline and used that 
power to gain a competitive advantage in a distribution services market.111  Although 
the plaintiff’s action failed, because it could not establish that a distribution services 
market actually existed,112 the court nevertheless mentioned, when discussing causes 
of action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, that one exists when “a firm... use[s] 
its monopoly power in one market to gain an unwarranted competitive advantage in 
another.”113  The court at least recognized the monopoly leveraging doctrine.   
Four years later, another circuit court in Grason Electric Co. v. Sacramento 
Municipal Utility Dist.114 found this language to be a definitive acceptance of the 
doctrine when it stated “[t]he Berkey Photo opinion, by virtue of its adopting in 
Mapp [sic], seems to have settled the question in this circuit of whether a ‘pure’ 
monopoly leveraging theory exists.”115
The monopoly leveraging doctrine seemingly reached a level of legitimacy as a 
result of the cases that nurtured the doctrine.  Missing, however, were any persuasive 
reasons from the courts for finding a competitive advantage violative of the Sherman 
Act.  This left the doors wide open for courts to attack the validity of the doctrine.      
D.  Rejection of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine 
Indeed, courts began to attack the validity of the doctrine.  The same year that the 
Grason Electric Co. decision suggested that the monopoly leveraging doctrine had 
been adopted in the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit began to disavow the doctrine 
and what it had said in M.A.P. Oil.116  In Catlin v. Washington Energy Co.,117
Washington Energy had a lawful monopoly in natural gas distribution, and the 
plaintiffs alleged that it used that monopoly power as a leverage to gain advantages 
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in a vent damper market by printing advertisements for its vent dampers on billing 
envelops that were sent to its gas customers.118  When confronted with the plaintiff’s 
argument that the Ninth Circuit adopted the monopoly leveraging theory in M.A.P. 
Oil, the court explained that because it did not elaborate on or apply the theory in 
M.A.P. Oil and only held that the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a 
second market, it had not formally adopted the doctrine.119  The court then reinforced 
its position by citing two cases in which it had held that more than a mere 
competitive advantage in the second market is required for a Section 2 violation.120
In one case it held that a requirement of any Section 2 cause of action is that in the 
second market there be “some associated conduct which constitutes an 
anticompetitive abuse or leverage of monopoly power... rather than aggressive 
competition on the merits.”121  In another case the court held that “[a] firm may not 
use its market position as a lever to create a monopoly in another market.”122  The 
court additionally questioned whether Berkey Photo intended to create a theory that 
prohibited the use of a lawful monopoly to gain any kind of competitive advantage in 
a second market, without an attempt to monopolize the second market.123  Although 
the court did not expressly reject the doctrine at this point, it essentially declined to 
decide whether that doctrine indeed did constitute a separate offense under Section 
2.124
Five years after Catlin, the Ninth Circuit used that decision to expressly and 
decisively reject the monopoly leveraging doctrine in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United 
Airlines, Inc.125  The case involved American Airlines’ government-approved attempt 
to create a computer reservation service with other airlines.126  The plan to create the 
service did not succeed, and ultimately, United Airlines and American Airlines 
created their own services.127  Other smaller airlines would use these services, and 
they did so by paying a per booking rate.128  Because United Airlines and American 
Airlines had the two dominating computer reservation services, they effectively 
enjoyed a monopoly power in this market.129  In their complaint, the smaller airlines 
alleged that the larger airlines, in controlling the computer reservation service 
market, engaged in display biasing; advertising their own flights in more desirable 
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locations than those of the smaller airlines.130  Therefore, the smaller airlines charged 
the larger airlines with monopoly leveraging by using their monopoly power in the 
computer reservation services market to gain a competitive advantage in the air 
transportation market.131
The court rejected the monopoly leveraging doctrine as established in Berkey and 
stated that “a plaintiff cannot establish a violation of Section 2 without proving that 
the defendant used its monopoly power in one market to obtain, or attempt to attain, 
a monopoly in the downstream, or leveraged, market.” 132   Therefore, the court 
concluded that Berkey’s holding that anticompetitive behavior arises from obtaining 
a competitive advantage was incorrect.133  After stating that Berkey was incorrect, it 
stated in a footnote that Griffith was not applicable either because it dealt with 
anticompetitive behavior violative of Section 1, concerted actions.134  Additionally, 
in the same footnote, it rejected Kerasotes for the same reason it rejected Berkey.135
The court stated two reasons for rejecting the monopoly leveraging doctrine.136
First, it took a literal approach in interpreting the Sherman Act, not recognizing a 
cause of action for behavior that falls short of monopolization or attempted 
monopolization.137   The court explained that the traditional interpretation of the 
Sherman Act was to punish “any individual or entity that uses ‘predatory’ means to 
attain a monopoly, or to perpetuate a monopoly after the competitive superiority that 
originally gave rise to the monopoly has faded.”138  In other words, the court believed 
that anticompetitive behavior, chargeable under the Sherman Act, did not arise when 
a monopolist uses a lawful monopoly in one market only to achieve a competitive 
advantage in a second market.139  The court’s view of the Sherman Act was that 
anticompetitive behavior only arises when a firm monopolizes and, at the very least, 
when a firm engages in an attempt to monopolize.140
Second, the court maintained that monopoly leveraging did not make a 
distinction between lawful and unlawful monopolies, as do causes of action such as 
monopolization and attempted monopolization. 141   The court explained that the 
Sherman Act only makes unlawful predatory monopolies, not monopolies such as 
efficient and natural monopolies.142  Therefore, the court’s argument relied on the 
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assumption that monopoly leveraging leads to lawful competition.  Indeed, it pointed 
out that “monopoly leveraging is just one of a number of ways that a monopolist can 
permissibly benefit from its position.” 143   The court even compared monopoly 
leveraging to the monopolistic behavior of setting high prices in the market in which 
the monopolist holds the monopoly.144  The court said that both monopoly leveraging 
and setting high prices “represent the cost that we incur when we permit efficient and 
natural monopolies.”145  Additionally, the court explained that “[t]he danger that a 
lawful monopoly will either create a new monopoly or unduly perpetuate itself is no 
more evident when a lawful monopoly is leveraged than when a lawful monopolist 
reaps its monopoly profit solely from price increases in the monopoly market.”146
The monopoly leveraging doctrine then suffered a small setback in the Second 
Circuit, ten years after it had been born in Berkey Photo.147  In Twin Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness,148 the court was faced with two companies that 
competed in two markets.149  The first was the market for bodybuilding magazines, 
and the second was for the production of nutritional supplements for bodybuilders.150
Twinlab published Muscular Development, which had a relatively small circulation 
compared to the magazines that Weider published, Muscle & Fitness and Flex,151
which were two leading magazines in the market.152  In the nutritional supplement 
market, Twinlab had five to twelve percent of the market share and Weider had ten 
to twenty-five percent of the market share.153  As Weider’s magazines were leading 
magazines in the market, Twinlab used them as its primary vehicles for 
advertisement for several years.154  That ended when Weider refused to deal with 
Twinlab and no longer accepted Twinlab’s advertisements.155  As a result, Twinlab 
asserted several claims against Weider including a claim for monopoly leveraging.156
The primary claim was a denial of essential facilities; however, within that claim, 
Twinlab alleged that Weider used its monopoly power in the magazine market to 
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attempt to monopolize the supplement market.157  In refusing to apply the theory it 
had established ten years earlier, the court stated that its creation of the monopoly 
leveraging theory was done in dictum, as the plaintiff in the earlier case did not raise 
the claim.158  Second, the court noted that in Berkey Photo the primary claim was 
tying and in Twin Laboratories, Inc. it was a denial of essential facilities.159  Finally, 
the court agreed that it alternatively established the doctrine in Berkey Photo, but 
noted that the doctrine, as it was established, required “tangible harm to 
competition.”160  Since the court found Twinlab to have remained in competition 
with Weider, it did not believe that the tangible harm element was established.161
The monopoly leveraging theory took another upset162 in the Third Circuit case of 
Fineman v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.163  Armstrong World Industries was a 
leading manufacturer of floor covering products.164  Distributors of Armstrong’s 
floor covering products depended on Armstrong for ninety-five percent of their 
business. 165   Fineman’s company, The Industry Network System, Inc. (TINS), 
developed a monthly videotape magazine designed for retailers of floor covering 
products. 166   Fineman alleged that Armstrong, when about to launch its own 
videotape magazine, used its leverage in the floor covering market to coerce its 
distributors to refuse to deal with TINS, thereby eliminating TINS in the videotape 
market and achieving its own competitive advantage in that second market.167  The 
court, however, found that a finding of a competitive advantage was not enough to 
warrant action under the Sherman Act.168  Rather, the court held that a plaintiff must 
show “threatened or actual monopoly in the leveraged market.”169
The court based its holding on several reasons.  First, it took a highly analytical 
approach in applying the literal framework of the Sherman Act by focusing on the 
differences between Section 1 and Section 2 of the Act.170  To support its approach, it 
cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp.,171 which did not address the monopoly leveraging doctrine, but held that a 
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company that is wholly owned by another company cannot engage in concerted 
action under Section 1.172  A single firm cannot engage in a Section 1 violation 
because two firms are required for an unreasonable restraint of trade such as a 
concerted action. 173   Additionally, a wholly owned company cannot engage in 
concerted action with its parent company as it is essentially one firm.174  As a result, 
the Copperweld Court stated that Section 1 “leaves a ‘gap’ in the Act’s prescription 
against unreasonable restraints of trade,”175 because Section 1 only targets multiple 
firms engaging in unreasonable restraints of trade when a single firm, e.g., one that 
engages in monopoly leveraging, can equally engage in such behavior if “it alone 
possesses the combined market power of those same two firms.”176
Using the “gap” theory, the Copperweld Court stated that as a result of the fact 
that the Sherman Act does not “prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such--but 
only restraints affected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy--it leaves 
untouched a single firm’s anti-competitive conduct (short of threatened 
monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct 
of two firms subject to Section 1 liability.”177  In other words, the Copperweld Court 
reasoned that anti-competitive conduct such as monopoly leveraging really fits under 
Section 1, but because it was intentionally left out of Section 1, and because Section 
2 expressly prohibits only monopolization and attempted monopolization, there is no 
place for a monopoly leveraging violation in the Sherman Act.178 Fineman, based 
upon Copperweld, concluded that because of the distinction between Section 1 and 
Section 2, the Sherman Act “does not make unlawful the entire universe of anti-
competitive conduct” 179  and “[i]t does not proscribe anti-competitive unilateral 
conduct that falls shy of threatened monopolization.”180
The second reason, upon which the Fineman court based its decision, dealt with 
the conception of the doctrine, and specifically with the procedural posture in 
Griffith. 181   In Griffith, the district court did not believe that there was a 
demonstration of a conspiracy to restrain trade.182  The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed the district court and remanded on the issue of “whether a necessary and 
direct result of the master agreements was the restraining or monopolizing of trade 
within the meaning of the Sherman Act.”183  As a result, Griffith neither decided 
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whether the movie theater leveraged its power in one market to gain a competitive 
advantage in another market, nor did it determine whether that behavior would be 
unlawful.184  Therefore, the court in Fineman stated that the broad statement made in 
Griffith should not be controlling.185
Also stressing the invalidly of the monopoly leveraging doctrine was the court in 
the recent case of General Cigar Holdings. 186   General Cigar was a cigar 
manufacturer based in the United States who brought several antitrust allegations, 
including one of monopoly leveraging, against Altadis, S.A., the world’s largest 
cigar manufacturer.187  Altadis had a monopoly in the cigar market outside of the 
United States, controlling seventy-eight percent of the market.188  In the United 
States, Altadis controlled thirty-nine percent of the market.189  In September 2000, 
however, Atladis acquired fifty percent of Corporacion Habanos, which had a 
monopoly in the Cuban cigar market.190  General Cigar alleged that Atladis used its 
newly found monopoly power in the Cuban cigar market to gain a competitive 
advantage in the United States markets.191
Responding to the plaintiff’s monopoly leveraging claim, the court first noted the 
circuit split and then rejected the doctrine along with the Third and Ninth Circuits.192
In an extensive analysis, it rejected the doctrine for several reasons.  It first embraced 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld, stating that Section 2 liability requires 
a threat of monopoly, rather than a competitive advantage.193  “Congress authorized 
Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of 
monopolization.  Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the 
antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive 
entrepreneur.” 194   The court also embraced Fineman stating that monopoly 
leveraging allows for a violation of Section 2 for “merely ‘unfair’ but non-
monopolistic unilateral activity.”195  It additionally cited Professors Philip E. Areeda 
and Herbert Hovenkamp for the proposition that “enlargement of the defendant’s 
market share at the plaintiff’s expense or even at the destruction of plaintiffs by 
unfair means” does not constitute anticompetitive behavior under Section 2 and 
rather “monopoly performance measured by reduced output or higher prices in the 
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secondary market” is required. 196   Though Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp 
embrace the doctrine and the court in General Cigar Holdings does not, the court 
nevertheless cited the Professors’ standard because, again, it raises the bar for 
anticompetitive monopoly leveraging conduct as this standard essentially requires 
monopolistic effects in the secondary market, not only a competitive advantage.197
Finally, the court embraced the Alaska Airlines argument that the monopoly 
leveraging is invalid because it does not make a distinction between lawful and 
unlawful monopolies.198
With no persuasive reason why it should exist, the monopoly leveraging doctrine 
stood defenseless against the mentioned theories for its rejection.  Combining the 
theories, taking a literal approach in interpreting the Sherman Act (not recognizing a 
cause of action for behavior that falls short of monopolization or attempt to 
monopolize), the fact that the monopoly leveraging doctrine does not make a 
distinction between lawful and unlawful monopolies, and the Section 1 “gap” theory 
established by the Supreme Court in Copperweld, the doctrine was severely 
weakened.   
III. SUPREME COURT TREMORS 
The Supreme Court has yet to directly decide the issue of whether monopoly 
leveraging constitutes a valid cause of action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.199
The Court, however, has made several conflicting statements that indirectly affect 
the doctrine.200  The first is that of the Section 1 “gap” theory of Copperweld, which 
was used in Fineman as a reason for rejecting the doctrine.  The second is found in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,201  decided a year before 
Fineman.  The Court stated that it “has held many times that power gained through 
some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can 
give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to 
expand his empire into the next.’”202  This language is nearly identical to that of the 
monopoly leveraging doctrine. To invoke the monopoly leveraging doctrine, a firm 
must use its dominant position in one market to expand itself in the second market.   
The statement made in Eastman Kodak, unlike the Section 1 “gap” theory, may 
have provided the monopoly leveraging doctrine with support to stand on.  A close 
examination of the facts of Eastman Kodak, however, shows that the Court’s 
statement does not entirely support the theory, at least where the theory only 
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demands a competitive advantage in the second market.203   In Eastman Kodak,
Kodak controlled “nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service 
market.”204  Therefore, Kodak willfully used its monopoly power in the parts market 
to increase its monopoly share in the service market. 205   Monopoly leveraging 
traditionally had not been used in the context of a firm already possessing a 
monopoly in the second market; if an increase in monopoly share in the second 
market indeed constitutes a competitive advantage, however, then the Supreme 
Court’s statement is in line with the monopoly leveraging theory.   
The monopoly leveraging doctrine had support for one year until the Supreme 
Court released its opinion in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan.206  In Spectrum
Sports, the Court held that Section 2 “makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful 
only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so.” 207   The 
monopoly leveraging doctrine suffered greatly under this holding, again, where the 
theory only demands a competitive advantage in the second market.208  Requiring a 
showing for monopolization or a dangerous attempt to monopolize goes well beyond 
the inherent framework of the theory, and only allows for a violation under Section 2 
for two causes of action, those of monopolization and attempted monopolization.209
The Court stated that “[t]he purpose of the Act is not to protect businesses from the 
working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market.  The 
law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but 
against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”210
With the Court’s statement, the issue then becomes what conduct unfairly tends 
to destroy competition itself.  Given the holding of the case, the Court believed that 
the only violations of Section 2 that destroy competition are monopolization and 
attempted monopolization.  The Supreme Court, however, does not stand alone, as 
the court in Davis v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.211 agreed with the 
Court’s reasoning in Spectrum Sports.  In Davis, the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
leveraging theory and stated “[t]he Supreme Court has recently explained that, where 
a single firm is involved, monopoly leveraging does not constitute a claim distinct 
from monopolization or attempted monopolization.”212
As evidenced by the preceding discussion of Eastman Kodak and Spectrum
Sports, even after the Supreme Court’s review of the doctrine, it is still unclear 
whether a cause of action for monopoly leveraging exists.  The Supreme Court has 
offered conflicting statements on the cause of action, and no clear guidance on the 
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issue, leaving plaintiffs to wonder whether or not to plead monopoly leveraging at 
all.  The Court, however, has the opportunity to eliminate the uncertainty by granting 
Verizon’s petition for writ of certiorari.  The Court must accept this case in order to 
delineate the bounds of actionable anticompetitive behavior violative of the Sherman 
Act.
IV. STATE OF THE MONOPOLY LEVERAGING DOCTRINE WHEN 
VERIZON PETITIONED FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Because there is a circuit split on the issue of whether a cause of action for 
monopoly leveraging exists and in what form, whether the firm’s conduct is 
actionable largely depends upon the circuit in which the firm is charged with 
leveraging its monopoly power.  An examination of the totality of the circuits and 
their various approaches to the doctrine reveals that three types of monopoly 
leveraging exist today.213  A further examination will show how to succeed on the 
traditional monopoly leveraging theory. 
A.  Three Types of Monopoly Leveraging 
The first type of monopoly leveraging is when a monopolist uses its monopoly 
power in one market to monopolize another market.214  This type is universally 
accepted by all circuits, including those that reject the traditional theory.215  The 
reason this type is universally accepted is because the theory combines the 
leveraging principle with the well established cause of action for unlawful 
monopolization, found in the text of  Section 2 itself.216
The second type of monopoly leveraging that exists today is when a monopolist 
uses its monopoly power in one market to attempt to monopolize another market.217
Similar to the first type of monopoly leveraging, this theory rests on the well-
established cause of action for attempted monopolization, also found in the text of 
Section 2.218  This type is also universally accepted in the courts.219
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The third type of monopoly leveraging that exists today is the traditional one 
established in Berkey Photo, where a monopolist leverages its monopoly power in 
one market to gain a competitive advantage in another market.220  Again, this is 
where the circuit split lies.  When a firm engages in monopoly leveraging gaining 
only a competitive advantage in the secondary market, and a plaintiff brings a cause 
of action in the Ninth and Third Circuits, its conduct will not be actionable under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act as these Circuits have rejected the idea of an 
anticompetitive-competitive advantage.221   Conversely, when a plaintiff brings a 
cause of action for monopoly leveraging in the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, 
its conduct will be actionable under Section 2.222  A major caveat, however, is that in 
the entire history of the monopoly leveraging doctrine, plaintiffs have successfully 
brought the cause of action only a few times.223  It is paradoxical that courts have 
rejected the doctrine because it sets too low a bar for anticompetitive behavior, when 
plaintiffs have succeeded in meeting its anticompetitive bar in only a few cases 
throughout the course of its history. 
B.  How to Succeed on the Traditional Monopoly Leveraging Theory 
Succeeding in a cause of action in monopoly leveraging is more difficult than 
courts in the Ninth and Third Circuits describe because of the many conditions that 
must be met to establish the doctrine.  Courts in the Second, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits first require proof of the three basic factors succinctly stated in Grand Light 
& Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.224  One, there must be monopoly power in one 
market.225  Two, the use of that power, however lawfully acquired, must foreclose 
competition, give the firm a competitive advantage, or destroy a competitor in a 
secondary market.226  Three, there must be injury caused by the conduct.227  Not only 
must competitors be injured, but competition itself must be injured by the conduct.228
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct “threatens the [second] market with 
the higher prices or reduced output or quality associated with the kind of monopoly 
that is ordinarily accompanied by a large market share.” 229   In addition to the 
elements the plaintiff must put forth, there are substantial exceptions looming over 
the successful claim of monopoly leveraging.  As stated in Berkey Photo,
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a large firm does not violate Section 2 simply by reaping the competitive 
rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business 
offend the Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from 
association with a division possessing a monopoly in its own market.  So 
long as we allow a firm to compete in several fields, we must expect it to 
seek the competitive advantages of its broad-based activity—more 
efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary products, 
reduced transaction costs, and so forth.  These are gains that accrue to any 
integrated firm, regardless of its market share, and they cannot by 
themselves be considered uses of monopoly power.230
Courts have additionally stated, “it is not unlawful for an existing firm, entering a 
new product market, to promote its product by touting the benefits afforded by that 
product’s association with the firm.  Nor it is unlawful for employees of one division 
of a firm to promote products produced by another division.”231  These exceptions 
demonstrate that courts view anticompetitive conduct with caution.  Courts are 
reluctant to find anticompetitive violations when evidence suggests that firms are 
reaping benefits from efficient business practices.   
Finally, a successful application of the doctrine may further be limited to cases in 
which the plaintiff can also successfully bring a tying action. 232   Though not 
expressly stated, tying may have been a requirement for successfully bringing a 
cause of action in monopoly leveraging since Berkey Photo. Berkey Photo involved 
a tying action and it was the first and one of the few instances where a plaintiff 
succeeded in bringing a cause of action for monopoly leveraging.233  Tying occurs 
when a firm only sells product one, the “tying product,” if the consumer purchases 
product two, the “tied product.”234  Therefore, a firm engages in both tying and 
monopoly leveraging when, as in Berkey Photo, it uses its monopoly power in the 
product 1 market to gain an advantage in the product 2 market by only selling 
product 2 if the consumer also purchases product 1. 235   When a plaintiff can 
successfully bring an action for tying, it greatly strengthens its monopoly leveraging 
claim because all of the requirements for monopoly leveraging fall in place, 
assuming plaintiff indeed had monopoly power in market 1.236
V. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. V. LAW OFFICES OF CURTIS V. TRINKO, LLP
The Supreme Court has the opportunity to draw a clear line for anticompetitive 
behavior violative of the Sherman Act through its ruling in Verizon.  Because a 
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circuit split exists, and the Court has offered conflicting statements on the cause of 
action, it must ameliorate the confusion. 
In Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,237 the plaintiff 
class member, who was a local phone service customer of AT&T, appealed the 
dismissal of its class action.238   AT&T provided the local phone service to the 
plaintiff by purchasing access to the local telephone network from Bell Atlantic, now 
known as Verizon Communications, Inc. 239   The case involved the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, which required Bell Atlantic, having a lawful 
monopoly in the local phone service market, to give AT&T and its other competitors 
equal access to its local network, for purposes of allowing them to compete.240  The 
plaintiff brought an action against Bell Atlantic alleging that it was damaged when 
Bell Atlantic refused to give AT&T equal access to its local network.241  The plaintiff 
alleged that Bell Atlantic refused to give AT&T equal access because AT&T 
received sub-par local phone service from Bell South.242 Bell South filled its own 
customers’ orders before the customers of AT&T, did not fill AT&T’s customers’ 
orders timely enough, sometimes failed to fill them at all, and additionally failed to 
provide AT&T with information regarding the status of its customers orders.243  The 
plaintiffs alleged that “Bell Atlantic's conduct had no valid business reason and was 
intended to exclude competition from the market ‘by making it difficult for its 
competitors to provide service in the Local Phone Service market on the level that 
Bell Atlantic is able to provide to its customers in that market.’”244  For its monopoly 
leveraging claim, the plaintiff alleged that Bell South used its monopoly power in the 
wholesale market, where it sold access to its local telephone network to AT&T, to 
gain a competitive advantage in the retail market, where it sells its own local 
telephone service to its customers.245
Although the district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss without 
considering the plaintiff’s monopoly leveraging claim, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.246  The Court 
of Appeals stated, “the plaintiff may have a monopoly leveraging claim” and further 
explained that the plaintiff successfully alleged the three elements of the claim;247
                                                                
237Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), 
petition for cert. filed sub nom.  Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 71 U.S.L.W. 3352 (2002). 
238Bell Atlantic, 305 F.3d at 92. 
239Id.
240Id. at 93. 
241Id. at 93. 
242Id. at 95. 
243Bell Atlantic, 305 F.3d at 95. 
244Id.
245Id. at 108. 
246Id. at 113. 
247Id. at 108. 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
258 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:235
namely, that Bell South possessed a monopoly power in the wholesale market, that 
Bell South used that power to gain a competitive advantage in the retail market, and 
that the plaintiff suffered an injury due to Bell South’s conduct.248
The Court of Appeals made its decision not only by following precedent on the 
monopoly leveraging doctrine in the Third Circuit, but also after plaintiffs set forth 
arguments in its motion for reconsideration 249  based upon a treatise written by 
Professors Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp regarding monopoly 
leveraging.250   Professors Areeda and Herbert recognize the cause of action for 
monopoly leveraging; however, they would limit its application to conduct that 
“threatens the [second] market with the higher prices or reduced output or quality 
associated with the kind of monopoly that is ordinarily accompanied by a large 
market share.”251  Although this helps the plaintiffs in Bell South, as they alleged 
what Professors Areeda and Herbert require, it raises the bar for anticompetitive 
monopoly leveraging conduct.  This standard requires monopolistic effects in the 
secondary market, not just a competitive advantage.252
On November 1, 2002, Verizon Communications Inc., formally known as Bell 
South, petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.253  Since Verizon’s 
filing of the petition, the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission have expressed their opinions on the monopoly leveraging doctrine.  
The DOJ and FTC argue against the validity of the monopoly leveraging doctrine 
and in favor of Verizon.254  The DOJ and FTC state that monopoly leveraging theory 
“countenances an antitrust violation unsupported by the Sherman Act’s text and 
fundamental antitrust principles.”255  As argued in Alaska Airlines, the DOJ and FTC 
argue for a literal interpretation of the Sherman Act, which allows only for causes of 
action in monopolization and attempted monopolization, and not one for gaining a 
competitive advantage with monopoly power.  The DOJ and FTC note the Court’s 
decision in Spectrum Sports,256 which held that Section 2 “makes the conduct of a 
single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to 
do so.”257  Furthermore, the DOJ and FTC state that monopoly leveraging “does not 
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require the monopolist’s conduct to be ‘exclusionary’ or ‘predatory’ within the 
meaning of Section 2 jurisprudence.”258
VI. HOW THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE
The Supreme Court should raise the bar for actionable monopoly leveraging 
conduct violative of the Sherman Act.  The Court should only recognize conduct that 
either leads to a monopoly, attempted monopoly or monopolistic effects in a second 
market, and eliminate as actionable, behavior that leads to competitive advantage in 
the second market.  To do this, the Court should recognize that there are three types 
of monopoly leveraging as previously discussed in this article. 259   Because the 
concept of leveraging can result based on three types of conduct, recognizing them 
would make it useful for characterizing the precise behavior exhibited by a firm as 
either violative of the Sherman Act, or not. 
If a firm uses its monopoly power in one market to acquire a monopoly in the 
second market, it has engaged in the highest degree of monopoly leveraging: 
unlawful monopolization through monopoly leveraging. 260   Moving down the 
spectrum of anticompetitive behavior, if a firm uses its monopoly power in one 
market to attempt to gain a monopoly in the second market, it has engaged in 
unlawful attempted monopolization through monopoly leveraging.261  If a firm uses 
its monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in the second 
market, however, the firm has engaged in lawful competitive behavior through 
monopoly leveraging.   
The Court must draw the line for anticompetitive behavior violative of the 
Sherman Act above the third type of conduct, where the firm merely gains a 
competitive advantage in the second market.  The line, however, should not be as 
high as the Ninth and Third Circuit courts would proclaim.  In other words, it should 
not fall immediately below the second type of conduct: attempted monopolization 
through monopoly leveraging.  The line should be high enough to make lawful the 
gain of a competitive advantage in the second market, but low enough to allow for 
one exception.  Namely, conduct that “threatens the [second] market with the higher 
prices or reduced output or quality associated with the kind of monopoly that is 
ordinarily accompanied by a large market share” would be conduct that qualifies as 
monopoly leveraging.262   Professors Areeda and Herbert recognize the excepted 
monopoly leveraging cause of action with this type of outcome in the second market 
because this standard requires monopolistic effects in the secondary market, not just 
a competitive advantage.263  It makes sense to allow this exception because it would 
limit those who could allege the cause of action to firms impacted by unlawful 
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monopolistic effects in the second market, thereby barring those firms who simply 
felt affects of competition to have a cause of action.264
The arguments against the unlawfulness of a mere gain of a competitive 
advantage in a second market through monopoly leveraging persuasively warrant 
this outcome.  Most persuasive is the Supreme Court’s decision in Spectrum Sports,
where the Court took a literal approach in interpreting the Sherman Act by holding 
that Section 2 “makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually 
monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so.”265
Unfortunately for the doctrine, there is no persuasive reason why it should exist.  
The best argument was given in Eastman Kodak, where the Court stated that it “has 
held many times that power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as 
a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits 
his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next.’”266  The 
Court, however, would likely discredit this argument for two reasons.  First, Kodak 
willfully used its monopoly power in the parts market to increase its monopoly share 
in the service market.267  Therefore, Kodak did more than merely gain a competitive 
advantage in the second market.268   Second, any confusion created by Eastman 
Kodak was resolved the following year in Spectrum Sports.
There are two final reasons for finding that the mere gain of a competitive 
advantage in the second market is not a violation of the Sherman Act.  First, even in 
the courts that have accepted the doctrine, few plaintiffs have succeeded on the 
merits.269  Second, history has already relegated the monopoly leveraging doctrine to 
the status of a throw-in cause of action:  it does not cost the plaintiff an additional fee 
to add it to the complaint.  However, once it is there, it imposes costs on the parties 
and the court in responding to it and dealing with the confusion it entails.   
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court should draw the line for anticompetitive behavior violative of the 
Sherman Act above the mere gain of a competitive advantage in the second market.  
If the Supreme Court were to draw the line at this level, the circuit split and the 
resulting confusion would be ameliorated.  By recognizing the three types of conduct 
that characterize monopoly leveraging, with the exception to the third type of 
conduct, the Supreme Court would provide much needed guidance for the lower 
federal courts in determining whether a firm’s behavior in a given case rises to the 
level of the monopoly leveraging.  The lower federal courts would have to examine 
three situations when presented with a monopoly leveraging cause of action: (1) 
whether monopolization occurred in the second market through leveraging, (2) 
whether attempted monopolization in the second market occurred through 
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leveraging, or (3) whether the leveraging produced “higher prices or reduced output 
or quality associated with the kind of monopoly that is ordinarily accompanied by a 
large market share”270  in the second market.  A clear pronouncement from the 
Supreme Court would not only help federal judges, but potential plaintiffs as well, 
leading ultimately to judicial economy.  Those contemplating bringing a cause of 
action for monopoly leveraging would have guideposts by which to measure the 
facts of their case against to determine whether the conduct at issue is within the 
spectrum of actionable conduct.  The waters that surround monopoly leveraging have 
been murky ever since the inception of the doctrine in 1948 in Eastman Kodak.271
Through Verizon, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to clear the waters once 
and for all.   
ANTHONY J. LAZZARO
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